By Kaija Schilde 1. What kind of rupture If this moment in transatlantic security is “a rupture, not a transition,”[1] the question is which institution or security arrangement is best suited to navigate this rupture. Military power requires institutions that generate defense resources over time from markets and society that can endure beyond ruptures. The only institution that can do this in the near and mid future in the transatlantic context outside of the US is the Europe

By Willem H. Buckley Not so much a rupture[i], as a war[ii]. History has not ended: there is no global consensus, and the military-industrial complex thrives. The United States (US) is secure and geographically insulated, while Europe anticipates increasing vulnerability to Russia from 2030. Middle powers still need collective security. Trump’s statecraft is confrontational, transactional and conditional. Successive US administrations have reasonably criticised Western Europe

By Peter Watkins Context This debate takes place against the backdrop of mounting concerns about potential Russian aggression against Europe. Within the EU, the commissioners from the Baltic States, Poland and Finland wrote to Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on 30th July warning of a "deteriorating security environment" amid an "increased frequency of airspace violations and drone incursions." Another portent was CIA Director John Ratcliffe’s surprise visit to Mosco

By Samuel B. H. Faure 1. EU Capacity-Building without State-Building Since 2022, Russia’s war against Ukraine has accelerated the supranationalisation of European Union (EU) defence-industrial instruments (Andersson and Britz, 2025). Beyond regulation, the EU has institutionalised new budgetary capacities, mobilising more than €9 billion over 2021–2027, plus €150 billion in guaranteed loans under SAFE.[1]Such capacity-building is remarkable in a domain of “core state powers

By J. Craig Stone Canada-EU defence cooperation has been progressing from an ad hoc NATO focussed relationship to a more structured strategic interdependence, driven by shared threat perceptions, technological changes, new partnerships, and institutional innovation within the transatlantic security framework. The focus of this think piece is to identify some of the opportunities and challenges that will need to be addressed to meet the Prime Minister’s intention of growing Ca

By Barbara J. Falk In light of the current ruptured world order and Canada’s requirement to engage in what Prime Minister Mark Carney has called “variable geometry,” this short think piece will focus on policy areas/lessons learned on which Canada can concretely focus and, at the same time, strengthen and learn from our relationships with our European NATO allies. First, Canada should develop and participate in opportunities to lead within NATO on Arctic issues. Second, Canad

By Mikhail A. Polianskii In November 2025, British and Norwegian patrols once again tracked the Yantar’(Янтарь), a Russian Ministry of Defence ‘research vessel’ which has long been suspected of mapping undersea cables carrying Europe's financial transactions and military communications. For years, the ship has sailed from the Kola Peninsula along Norway’s coast and up the east coast of North America, quietly mapping critical NATO infrastructure. Yet chances are you have nev

By Winfried Heinemann During the late 1940s, the Soviet threat to Europe was perceived as political rather than military – hardly anyone thought the Soviet Union capable of waging another world war so soon after the devastations of 1941-1944. But the Communist coup d’état in February 1948 in Prague, where there were no Soviet troops, was seen by many in the West as the writing on the wall. Could the same not happen in France where in the 1947 elections, the Communists had b